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Executive Summary 
Trade Secrets are a flexible innovation tool that are used across sectors and types of 
firms. This report summarises and critiques the publicly available economic research 
on trade secrets and highlights key innovation aspects.  
A trade secret is knowledge that is secret, valuable and reasonably protected. 
Misappropriation or theft of trade secrets, according to industry estimates, is said to 
cost between 1-3% of GDP in developed economies (Passman, 2014). Enshrined in 
the WTO’s 1996 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement, 
trade secrets are an increasingly important innovation policy. The US, EU and Japan 
have all recently made major changes to trade secrets policy. 
Key findings on economic and innovation impact: 
Trade secrets are a preferred strategy for innovative UK firms. 70% of UK firms who 
develop product and process innovations use trade secrets to protect these 
innovations (Hall, Helmers, Sena & Rogers, 2012). Trade secrets are particularly 
important to UK firms in the R&D services, tech, and across manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors. Larger firms rely on trade secrets more than smaller firms.  
Trade secrets can be highly valuable firm assets, although most trade secrets are not. 
Trade secrets have a wide scope of coverage and support the innovation ecosystem 
by protecting process, product, market and organisational innovations, and by 
providing a key complement and support to other IP.  
Firms choose trade secrets to maintain a competitive advantage by avoiding the 
disclosure associated with other types of IPR. However, trade secrets are vulnerable 
to reverse engineering and misappropriation or theft. Cybertheft and economic 
espionage are increasing concerns.  Trade secrets are often a lower cost alternative 
to other IPR, although enjoy relatively weaker protection.  
Trade secrets serve as a substitute or complement to patents. UK Patenting firms are 
more likely to protect a larger proportion of their innovations using secrecy than non-
patenting firms.i Patents are preferred for product innovations, and trade secrets for 
process innovations. Most trade secrets cover non-patentable innovation such as 
marketing and organisational innovations.  
Trade secrets support innovation but also restrict knowledge flows and labour mobility. 
Stronger policy benefits existing trade secrets holders and encourages investment in 
R&D, yet reduces future innovation and creates barriers to entry. There is a balance to 
be struck between trade secrecy that encourages innovation, and trade secrecy that 
blocks innovation. 
However, many questions remain and the empirical evidence base for trade secrecy is 
weak. This report finds that further work is needed to develop an evidence base for 
trade secrets, and that exploration of key themes such as the interaction of trade 
secrets with patentability could better inform policy. 
  
Introduction 
The last two decades have seen a growing emphasis on the role of trade secrets as 
an intellectual property (IP) protection mechanism. Trade secrets are a preferred 
means of protection for innovative firms. Global legal and economic trends suggest 
that growth in the use of trade secrets is outpacing that of patents. The theft or 
misappropriation of trade secrets may translate to an annual cost of 1-3% of GDP in 
advanced industrial nations (Passman, 2014). The EU, US and Japan have all 
enacted major trade secret policy changes in the last five years. However, relatively 
little is understood about this important intellectual property right (IPR) and its 
economic impacts. This paper brings together key strands of economic analysis of IP, 
based on a literature review of academic and policy research and informed by experts' 
understanding. 
The UK is ranked above average for trade secrets protection (Barbe & Linton, 2016).  
Global litigation trends, for example the 14% annual growth rate in US trade secret 
litigation from 2001-2012 (Elmore, 2016), suggest that trade secrets will become 
increasingly important for the UK economy. However, empirical evidence for trade 
secrets is fraught by significant methodology challenges as it requires estimating a 
subject that it, by definition, secret. Thus, relatively little is understood about this 
important mechanism for firm strategy and innovation. 
This report seeks to provide a comprehensive review of academic (since 2000) and 
grey literature (since 2012).ii It is restricted to economic, management and empirical 
analysis of trade secrets.iii  The report proceeds as follows: an explanation of trade 
secrets and their context, economic themes of trade secrets, a critical analysis of the 
literature that looks at the who, what, why and how of trade secrets, and, finally, 
analysis and recommendations for policymakers. 
  
Context and Trends   
As stipulated in the WTO Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) 1996 
agreement, the accepted definition of trade secrets is information that must meet three 
criteria:  
1. it must be secret. 
2. it must be reasonably protected. 
3. it must derive value from its secrecy. 
The classic example of a trade secret is the Coca-Cola formula, or recipes such as the 
Irn Bru and Lea & Perrins recipes. Trade secrets can encompass a very broad scope 
of subject matters, from business confidential information such as customer lists, 
source code for software to chemical production processes. Large pharmaceutical 
companies like GSK and AstraZenca may use trade secrets to protect test results. 
Trade secrets are used in all sectors of the economy. Trade secrets can serve as 
complements or substitutes to patents, and can be used alongside other rights such 
as copyright, trade marks and design rights, and at any point of the R&D cycle. They 
do not require registration and generally retain their protection, as long as they remain 
secret. As such, they are a very flexible IP protection mechanism.  
Advantages to trade secrets ownership are the ability to protect innovations that might 
not qualify for other IP, the flexibility of trade secrets, the lack of need to formally 
register the trade secret, the potentially lower cost of protection compared to IP, the 
potential for trade secrecy protection to last indefinitely, and, perhaps most 
importantly, the lack of disclosure. The trade secret, as a secret, provides little 
information to competitors.  
Disadvantages of trade secrets, for trade secret owners, is that their protection may be 
relatively weak. Once public, the trade secret is no longer a trade secret. Trade 
secrets are vulnerable to misappropriation, independent discovery and reverse 
engineering.iv With the rising connectedness of firms and the increasing use of digital 
means for storing trade secrets, trade secrets are now a popular target of cyber 
crime.v Additionally, it is not given that their protection is cheaper than patents, and 
the enforcement of rights may be equally costly, with litigation resulting in further loss 
of secrecy and with unclear remedies and damages.  
Do trade secrets support innovation? Innovation can be categorised into four types 
where the subject is new or significantly improved: product (good or service), process 
(production or delivery method), marketing (product design or packaging, product 
placement, product promotion or pricing) and organisational (business practices, 
workplace organisation or external relations) (DATA, 2005). Trade secrets are more 
popular with process than product innovations. This is largely due to the disclosure 
requirement of other forms of IP protection, such as patents. Processes may also be 
beyond the scope of patentability, particularly those associated with marketing and 
organisational innovations; it is also difficult for firms to monitor infringement of 
process patents. The principle of disclosure is that the knowledge or content protected 
by the IP must be public in order for it to benefit from protection. Product innovations 
may be more obvious to competitors and therefore more susceptible to reverse 
engineering. However, process innovations can be opaque and therefore the lack of 
disclosure offered by trade secrets make trade secrets an attractive protection 
mechanism. Know-how, which supports both process and product innovations, often 
benefits from trade secrecy.    
Trade secrets are a crucial form of protection for business confidential information, 
some of which can fall under marketing and organisational innovations. Customer 
lists, bidding information and other information assets can all qualify for trade secrecy. 
For marketing and organisational innovations, trade secrecy is an obvious business 
and policy tool to support and incentivise innovation. For information assets that fall 
into the grey area, where they may not strictly be considered innovation, the 
relationship between these trade secrets and innovation is less clear. However, these 
business critical assets may represent innovation internal to the firm and underpin the 
aspects of the wider innovation ecosystem for firms. These trade secrets provide 
foundations for contracts such as Non-Disclosure-Agreements (NDAs) and 
employment contracts, and protect development and market strategies such as lead 
time advantages.  Without the foundations of trade secrets, firms would have to divert 
significant resources to protecting such intangible assets. 
Policy Context 
Trade secrets are global rights, although their legal construct varies by jurisdiction. 
They are included in TRIPS Article 39, and therefore enjoy at least minimum 
protections across World Trade Organisation (WTO) member states. In the UK, trade 
secrecy protection largely sits within civil law under tort and contract law. Not all 
jurisdictions or scholars recognise trade secrets formally under the banner of IPR 
(Martinis, Gaudino, & Respess, 2013). In some jurisdictions misappropriation or theft 
can be a criminal act, although this criminalisation is controversial (Clough, 2011).   
Major developed economies have modified their trade secrets law since 2016. The 
European Union sought to clarify and harmonise trade secrecy protection across 
member states with the Trade Secrets Directive of 2016. The United States has 
adopted an expansionist approach, criminalising the theft of trade secrets in 1996 with 
the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) and harmonising and expanding protections in 
2016 with the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). In 2018, Japan revised its Unfair 
Competition Act to provide civil and criminal remedies for trade secrets. Trade secrets 
are currently included in pending multilateral trade agreement negotiations. For 
example, the 2018 United States- Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) revision of 
the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) includes provisions for the 
expansion of trade secrets protection and the criminalisation of trade secrets 
misappropriation. 
  
Economic construction  
The core economic justification for IPR is that they provide incentives to innovate. 
Under incentive to innovate, also known as the social contract theory of IP, society 
grants innovators exclusive rights to their innovations. This allows innovators to reap 
the rewards of their innovative efforts, recoup their investment in innovation and 
continue innovating. Society benefits with continued innovation and the disclosure of 
knowledge to spur further innovation. To avoid long-term monopolies and encourage 
further innovation these rights have an expiration, at which point the knowledge 
protected by the IPR can be freely used. IP introduces a static inefficiency (the 
monopoly of IPR) in exchange for a dynamic efficiency (continued innovation.) IPR 
such as copyright and patents fit this model nicely.   
Trade secrecy largely fits this incentive model but with two caveats: the lack of 
disclosure and the lack of a predetermined expiration of protection. Trade secrets are, 
by definition, not disclosed and can theoretically last forever. This leads to criticism 
that trade secrets restrict the acquisition of ideas, unacceptably restrict labour mobility, 
and stifle competition (Hettinger, 1989). This limits R&D spillovers (an exchange of 
ideas external to a R&D project), and leads to reduced innovation and lower 
productivity growth. These aspects are mitigated by the fact that trade secrets 
generally enjoy weaker protection than patents and copyright by offering no protection 
against reverse engineering and independent discovery. There is a trade-off between 
the strength of trade secrets protection and its innovation aspects, as discussed later. 
There is, however, a very important non-economic justification for trade secrets: the 
disclosure requirement of the IPR system implicitly suggests a right not to disclose 
(Paine, 1991). Thus the economic justification of disclosure for patents, copyright and 
other IPR, counterintuitively lays the foundation for trade secrecy.   
In addition to incentive aspects, trade secrets policy complements investments in 
physical protections and cybersecurity, reducing the need for firms to over-invest 
(Martinis et al., 2013) and consequently freeing up investment for other purposes such 
as R&D. However, an important counterpoint to this argument is that cybersecurity 
itself is an important font of innovation, thus investment in cybersecurity for trade 
secret protection translates into funds for cybersecurity R&D.  
Policy makers and firms recognise the value of trade secrets. Significant policy 
changes in the last five years suggest that trade secrets are, and will continue to be, a 
crucial fixture in the innovation landscape. However, while trade secrets are very 
important in practice, economic understanding of their use, the impact on innovation, 
and other aspects is relatively underdeveloped. 
  
Economic and Empirical research: Themes  
In US and EU policy debates, the emphasis is on the economic impact of trade 
secrets. However, this emphasis has not yet been matched by research interest, in 
part due to the relative paucity of data, although this is changing (Arundel, 2001) 
(Almeling, 2012), (Morikawa, 2019). This section identifies key themes in the existing 
economic and empirical literature and popular methodologies. The core narrative in 
the economics literature is trade secrets as a means to provide a legal structure for 
innovators to appropriate the returns to their innovation. This literature falls under the 
economics of Industrial Organisation and Innovation, with a strong emphasis on IP 
aspects of trade secrets. Given the dearth of data associated with trade secrets, which 
are by nature secret, empirical work is scant; likewise, theoretical models of trade 
secrets are also limited, particularly in comparison to the well-developed literature on 
patents.  
Two key themes in economic research of trade secrets are firms’ preferences for trade 
secrets as a protection mechanism and trade secrets in contrast to patents. 
Conventional wisdom has dictated that patents are the gold standard of IP protection, 
particularly in manufacturing.  However, research over the last two decades has 
instead found that trade secrets are the preferred mechanism for protection (Cohen et 
al., 2000; Arundel 2001, Anton & Yao 2004; Png 2012, 2015; Crass et al., 2016, 
among others). For example, in a of study US manufacturing firms on their process 
and product innovations, Cohen, Nelson & Walsh (2000) find that both secrecy and 
lead-time to market were preferred to patents for both types of innovations. In light of 
these findings, trade secrets take a bigger and more important role in the practice and 
policy innovation environment for firms and economies. Patents and other formal IPR 
may be less important than originally thought. 
Methodologies  
Despite evidence that trade secrets are an important mechanism for innovators, their 
secrecy means we have only limited knowledge of their function in practice.  Research 
methodologies align along two approaches: theoretical and empirical.  As noted by 
(Hall, Helmers, Rogers, & Sena, 2014), theory models often focus on patents versus 
secrecy where an invention is the unit of analysis, and where empirical methods tend 
to address data at the firm level. This difference makes theory difficult to test with 
empirics, as virtually no information is available at the invention or innovation level. 
These approaches enjoy strengths and weaknesses in developing useful findings for 
policy and managers.  
Theoretical approaches to economic analysis of trade secrets are generally 
mathematical models that apply game theory in the context of competition. These 
models often describe the behaviour of innovative firms (agents) competing with each 
other, and examine the role of trade secrets (e.g. in firm decision-making, profit 
maximisation, policymaking or impact on social welfare). This approach necessarily 
requires a number of assumptions about reality, e.g. there are only two firms operating 
in a particular market, and therefore is open to criticism that they do not capture reality 
and are difficult to test. Theoretical models generally focus on single innovations, as 
opposed to groups of innovations or macroeconomic analysis. However, these 
theoretical models are crucial for theory development, and offer both positive 
(identifying facts) and normative (suggesting how things should be) findings. They 
may provide theory to shape policymaking, but are relatively poor at offering evidence 
to support such theories. 
Empirical Methodologies 
Empirical approaches can test or develop theory, and generally focus on groups of 
innovations or economy-wide impacts. Data is scarce. The measurement of trade 
secrets is challenging as these are secret and intangible rights, and firms are often 
reluctant to disclose information for fear of revealing information and strategies. 
Defining the size of a trade secret, in economic terms, is akin to answering the 
question, ‘how long is a piece of string?’. It is also difficult to match innovations on a 
like-for-like basis, e.g. some innovations will be patentable, others will not. As 
discussed in this section, common empirical approaches for trade secret research are 
innovation surveys, other self-reporting surveys, semi structured interviews, natural 
experiments and litigation data.   
Surveys offer appealing evidence for trade secrets as they can provide relatively 
concrete numbers and findings. Surveys generally seek to collect data via 
questionnaires of a sample population. Large-scale, regular surveys include the 
biennial EU Community Innovation Survey (CIS). However, these surveys rely on self-
reporting, which is subject to recollection and bias problems. These problems are 
amplified in trade secrets research as firms are often loathe to report their trade secret 
strategy, or even the existence of trade secrets, for fearing of disclosing information 
which could be valuable for competitors. There are also additional incentives not to 
report the misappropriation of trade secrets as they may have reputational impacts. 
Anecdotal evidence and low response rates in some surveys confirm this.   
Semi-structured interviews, similar to surveys, involve posing questions to a sample. 
However, they generally have a smaller sample size and are less prescriptive. The 
main advantage of this approach is the richness of the resulting data, however the 
necessarily small sample size is highly susceptible to bias. Semi-structure interviews 
in trade secrets are not very popular in economic research, as they provide a weaker 
basis for generalisation.   
Natural experimentsvi in trade secret analysis, usually based on changes in policy, 
offer a fairly robust method to test the impact of trade secrecy. Natural experiments 
examine the impact on a population of a test variable, in this case a change in trade 
secrets laws, in contrast to a control population which has not been subject to the 
change. For example, the uneven introduction of the misleadingly titled Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act (UTSA) in the US has provided means for researchers to test the impact 
of changes to state law. While natural experiments offer a means to robustly test the 
impact of changes that would otherwise be impossible to test (e.g. it would be 
inappropriate to place firms in the same jurisdiction under different legal regimes for 
testing purposes), they are open to spurious correlations as the two populations under 
study may have unobserved differences.  Additionally, the availability of data to 
perform such analysis is limited.  
A final means for empirical investigation of trade secrets is litigation data. This 
involves collecting data from civil or criminal courts in trade secrets disputes. An 
advantage of this data is it includes information on trade secrets that might not be 
captured otherwise, such as the trade secret itself. However, this data suffers from two 
main challenges: access and identification, and sample selection bias. Trade secrets 
disputes may be difficult to identify in jurisdictions where there is not a specific statute, 
such as the UK; and access to court records varies. Additionally, only a sub-section of 
disputes reach court, and therefore court data does not capture disputes settled out of 
court and trade secrets in general. Caution should be taken when attempting to 
generalise from litigation data. 
There is no clear frontrunner in the robustness of empirical data for trade secrets. This 
creates a challenge for policymakers, as it is difficult to identify the relevant market 
failures and understand the potential impact of various policy options. However, both 
empirical and theoretical findings all point to an innovation system in which trade 
secrets are important, and potentially more important than alternative IPR. The next 
section looks at these findings more specifically. 
  
Analysis of Economic and Empirical Literature 
Economic research on trade secrets is growing and governments are increasingly 
commissioning trade secrets-related research. This section of the report provides an 
analysis of key academic research since 2000 and policy research since 2012. 
Academic papers were identified using online databases following the traditional 
method of literature review. Policy papers were identified using a combination of 
online research, building on the author’s existing work and in consultation with UK IPO 
trade secrets experts. Five policy reports were particularly useful: two UK IPO reports 
using survey evidence to investigate firms (Arora, Athreye & Huang, 2013; Hall, 
Helmers, Sena & Rogers, 2012); two reports from the European Commission (EC) – 
one a large survey on trade secrets and innovation (Martinis et al., 2013) and the 
other on cyber theft (Georgescu, 2018); and finally a report on litigation by the EU 
Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (Wajsman & García-Valero, 2017). Where 
deemed relevant, papers in the management discipline and empirical legal 
approaches were included.vii  
The economics literature focuses on the interactions of agents within an economy and 
how changes can affect these interactions. This section is structure around four key 
questions:  
1. Who uses trade secrets? Characteristics of firms and sectors in relation to 
trade secrets.  
2. What are trade secrets? Types of trade secrets and their value.  
3. Why use trade secrets? Firm decision making and preferences.  
4. How are trade secrets used? With other IPR, in firms and in economies. 
  
Who uses trade secrets? Sectors and Firms 
Characteristics 
Firms may not always be forthcoming about their use of trade secrets, but survey 
evidence points to trends in the popularity of trade secrets among different sectors, 
particularly manufacturing, and the types of firms. Innovative firms are heavier users of 
trade secrets than non-innovative firms, and larger firms heavier than small.  
Sectors  
The importance of trade secrets for the manufacturing sector, a sector that benefits 
from a long history of innovation analysis, is well-established. More granular research 
suggests some manufacturing sectors use trade secrets more than others. Some 
indicative findings:  
• Older firms in mechanical and materials engineering prefer process 
technologies protected by trade secrets, to product patents for 
competitiveness; younger firms exhibit lower patent competence (internal 
resources and knowledge) (Sweden) (Holgersson, 2013).  
• Semiconductor manufacturing and manufacturers with software applications 
are the two most commonly observed sectors in trade secret theft cases 
(US) (Searle, 2012).   
• Textiles, apparel & leather, and chemicals, rubber & plastic rank secrecy as 
an important appropriation method more so than other sectors (Finland) 
(Leiponen & Byma, 2009).  
• Secrecy is observed to be particularly important to the chemicals, metal, 
and drugs sectors (US) (Cohen et al., 2000).  
Sectors are also found to have specific concerns about the threat of loss of trade 
secrecy. The EC report (Martinis et al., 2013) finds that the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sectors particularly believe that the risk of trade secret 
misappropriation has increased, while the motor vehicle and pharmaceutical industries 
are concerned about industrial espionage. While generally confirming the importance 
of trade secrecy for the manufacturing sectors, the high heterogeneity of the sector-
specific findings suggest a particular sector’s preferences vary by time, country and 
survey. 
Trade secrets are also important to the service sector, as they provide protection for 
key service processes and business confidential information such as customer lists. 
The importance of trade secrets for services, and wholesale and retail trade, is less 
well-evidenced (Martinis et al., 2013), although Searle (2012) observes that 17% of 
US federal criminal trade secrets cases from 1996-2008 involved firms in the service 
sector. In a study of Japanese firms, the percentage of manufacturing and service 
sectors holding trade secrets is roughly the same (1/3), with 51% of R&D active 
service sector firms also holding trades (12% higher than the same type of firm in the 
manufacturing sector) (M. Morikawa, 2019). Further, service firms use secrecy when 
their sector has high technological uncertainty (Crass, Garcia Valero, Pitton & 
Rammer, 2019). Given the breadth of trade secret protection, it is not surprising that 
the service sector finds them useful. 
Firm Size  
Generally, the literature finds that larger firms use trade secrets more than smaller 
firms. However, “more” varies by definition and these findings are dominated by self-
report survey methodologies.  Small firms have notoriously low awareness and 
knowledge of IP (Burrone, 2005; Hynynen, 2013; Petit, Dubois, Harand & Quazzotti, 
2011; Sukarmijan & Sapong, 2014). In the UK, SMEs are largely unaware of the IP 
system, confirmed in both 2006 (Pitkethly, Lewis & House, 2006) and 2010 (Pitkethly, 
2010). As a result, small firms may be less aware and articulate about their innovation 
protections, and therefore under-report their use of trade secrecy. Despite this 
challenge, the literature is fairly consistent in finding that larger firms use trade secrets 
more, and that large and small firms may prefer trade secrets to other forms of IPR. 
In the UK, as per Table 1, one estimate finds that roughly 30% of firms use trade 
secrets and this use is higher in large firms (59% of those who use trade secrets) 
versus small firms (28%) (Hall, Helmers, Sena, Rogers, 2012). Similar international 
findings:  
• Large innovating firms use both trade secrets and patents more than 
innovating SMEs, as a measure by percentage of firms, in the UK, 
Germany, Finland and Italy (Wajsman & García-Valero, 2017); this is further 
confirmed for Germany in (Crass et al., 2019).  
• Globally, larger firms in the international wine industry prefer trade secrets 
more than smaller firms (Beukel, Tyler, Fernandez, Cruz & Lahneman, 
2018).  
• In Germany large firms use trade secrets more than patents, but rate 
patenting as more effective than secrecy; medium size firms view patents 
and secrets as equally effective; small firms rate secrecy as more effective 
than patenting (Crass et al., 2019).  
• In Finland smaller firms prefer trade secrets to patents (Leiponen & Byma, 
2009).  
• In the US the smaller the firm, the more intensive the use of trade secrets 
(Searle & Reid, 2012). 
The use of trade secrets in small firms may be more vulnerable. For example, “SMES 
are more exposed than large companies to the threat of cyber theft of trade secrets” 
because of lack of knowledge of threat and cyber breaches, insufficient funds for 
cybersecurity investment (Martinis et al., 2013, p. 33-34). Small firms are less able to 
pursue trade secret misappropriation, as they have less resources and IP knowledge 
at their disposal. However, the loss of a trade secret can be devastating for a small 
firm, which may have few other innovations. 
 
UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS) (1998-2007): 
• 67.8% of UK firms don’t use secrecy 
• Use is higher in innovative firms: 
o 70% of firms who innovate both product and process use trade secrets 
o 55% of product only innovators 
o 44% of process only innovators 
• Use is higher in larger firms (59%) than small firms (28%) 
• Use is higher in firms who patent (82%) than those who do not  
  
What are trade secrets? Types of trade secrets and 
their value 
The secrecy of trade secrets makes their value and contents difficult to understand. 
Trade secrets can be extremely valuable, such as the Coca-Cola formula, or 
mundane, such as the contents of a presentation to potential investors. 
Value  
As with many types of IPR, valuing and defining an individual trade secret can be 
difficult. As intangible assets, there are no clear definitions of the scope (with, to a 
degree, the exception of patents), market, and value. These are compounded by the 
secret nature of trade secrets. Some trade secrets are very valuable, but most are not 
(Reid, Searle & Vishnubhakat, 2014). This is consistent with other types of intellectual 
property.   
Valuation methods for trade secrets, as with other types of IP and assets, generally 
fall under three categories: market, income, and cost (Searle & Brassell, 2016). The 
market approach is an estimation of the fair market value of a trade secret; this is a 
challenging approach as sales of trade secrets are often confidential. Using income to 
value a trade secret involves analysing the associated cash flows, such as sales or 
royalties. In the case of a dispute, income methods can be used to estimate the lost 
profits of the trade secret owner, the unjust enrichment of the alleged misappropriator 
or potential reasonable royalties. Cost approaches look at the costs to develop or 
replicate the secret, such as the R&D cost used originally, or the cost to reverse 
engineer or independently develop a secret.    
Concrete valuations of trade secrets are difficult. (Hall, Helmers, Sena & Rogers, 
2012) note that a 2011 US court valued DuPont’s misappropriated trade secrets at 
nearly USD$1 Billion, working out to USD$6.3M per secret. Yet different 
methodologies provide different results, and even then it is difficult to unpack the 
incremental value of the trade secret from the innovation in question. For example, 
court documents in US v. Zhang,viii a criminal case alleging the theft of trade secrets 
present a range of USD$3M-$65M for valuations of the trade secret. These were: 
USD$25-65M in potential lost profits, development costs of USD$55M, and future 
sales of USD$3-18M. Valuations should be appropriately scrutinised, as they are 
debatable and variable.  
Types of trade secrets  
Trade secrets can encompass a wide scope of innovation, know-how and business 
information. There is little study on the breakdown of what trade secrets protect in 
practice. Generally, trade secrets are used more to protect processes than product 
innovations (Arundel, 2001; Cohen et al., 2000; Crass et al., 2019; Leiponen & Byma, 
2009); although Morikawa (2019) finds this is only true in the manufacturing sector. In 
the EC study, the top three assets protected by trade secret are: commercial bids and 
contracts, and contractual terms; customer or supplier lists and related data; and 
financial information and business planning (Martinis et al., 2013). Firms in this study 
also view trade secrets as valuable for protecting the following: R&D data, process 
know-how and technology, formulae and recipes, product technology, and marketing 
data and planning. In a study of 200 US criminal court cases (on file with author), the 
most popular types of trade secrets are: business confidential information, 
software/source code, miscellaneous technical information and a combination of 
technical and business confidential information.   
There are also ‘negative’ trade secrets – trade secrets in knowing what does not work. 
A failed avenue of research allows a firm to avoid incurring further costs; competitors 
however, may invest significant resources to end up with the same failure. Software 
vulnerabilities can also be trade secrets. The ability to keep these types of information 
secret conveys competitive advantages.   
Despite the lack of detail on trade secrets in practice, it is clear they are used for a 
wide scope of information assets. However, a key unanswered question for 
policymaking is the balance between trade secrets that are defined as innovations as 
per categories in (DATA, 2005), and those that are not but still form a key part of the 
innovation ecosystem. 
  
Why use trade secrets? Firm decision making, 
disclosure and costs 
Trade secrets are a strategic tool to appropriate the rewards of a firm’s innovations. 
Disclosure is a key factor in the decision to use trade secrets. However, trade secrets 
come with costs and their protection is not given. This section discusses aspects on 
why firms use trade secrets. 
Disclosure 
In contrast to other forms of IPR, trade secrets do not involve disclosure. This is a key 
advantage to trade secrecy for the innovating firm as it limits the information 
competitors glean about a firm’s innovations. The product or service itself may 
disclose information and affect the degree of imitability, hence the relative preference 
for protecting processes with trade secrets as they are less imitable. The benefits of 
the lack of disclosure are greater when competitors are better able to imitate. At the 
same time, disclosure can be used strategicallyix to signal information to other firms in 
the market, or to make information public and consequently thwart the patenting of the 
innovation (Hayter & Link, 2018). Given that the lack of disclosure is important in 
practice, for example, 52% of firms in the EC study cite avoiding the disclosure of 
confidential information as the most important use of trade secrecy (Martinis et al., 
2013), research generally focuses on this aspect of trade secrets. 
Theoretical models provide insights as to why this might be the case. A key model by 
Anton & Yao, (2004) based on disclosure, argues firms use patents for small 
innovations and trade secrets for larger innovations. They argue that this is particularly 
the case when innovation protections, such as IPR, are weak.x Similarly, firms are 
also more likely to use trade secrecy when the threat of knowledge leakage is higher, 
and patents when this threat is lower (Bhattacharya & Guriev, 2006). However, the 
lack of disclosure has implications for knowledge flows. For example, trade secrecy 
can limit innovation under an Open Science model (Mukherjee & Stern, 2009). 
Costs  
The direct costs of trade secrecy involve insuring it is reasonably protected. This 
involves a combination of handling and access protections (Hannah, 2005), such as 
non-disclosure agreements and computer security (see Bos, Broekhuizen & de Faria, 
2015 for a literature review). In general, these are costs likely already incurred as 
good practice in terms of physical security, cyber security and information handling. 
Trade secrets are therefore considered a relatively cost-effective measure for IP 
protection. However, the indirect costs of enforcing trade secrecy, including detection 
of misappropriation and theft, and the subsequent legal costs, can be high. For small 
firms, it may be prohibitively costly, which weakens protection. Furthermore, 
cybersecurity by firms is often suboptimal, e.g. the EU lags behind in terms of 
detection of cyber breaches (Georgescu, 2018), and IT departments do not 
necessarily include trade secrets in their decision-making. It should not be taken for 
granted that trade secrecy is cost-effective. 
An indirect cost of trade secrecy is on the knowledge flows within the firm (James, 
Leiblein & Lu, 2013; King, 2007). Innovation requires knowledge, and restrictions of 
the spread of knowledge can hamper a firm’s R&D efforts. Firms must balance 
knowledge protection and the need for that knowledge to be copied and shared 
(Hurmelinna, Kyläheiko, & Jauhiainen, 2007). Yet, employees do not like having 
limited access to firm knowledge, and this can affect company culture. A culture of 
trust within the firm encourages employees to protect trade secrets (Hannah, 2005; 
Shore et al., 2004; Taylor & Tekleab, 2004). Thus, paradoxically, a reliance on trade 
secrets can undermine a firm’s innovation, particularly in firms with low levels of trust. 
Loss of trade secrecy: Means and costs  
The decision to use trade secrets necessarily involves accepting a risk of the loss of 
this secrecy. A trade secret can lose its protection if it fails to remain secret, valuable 
or reasonably protected. Of these three, secrecy is the biggest threat to the loss of 
protection, or at least a loss of the exclusivity of this protection. This can happen in a 
relatively benign manner, such as reverse-engineering or independent discovery, or in 
malicious circumstances such as misappropriation or theft. Accidental loss of secrecy 
can also happen, for example, when employees inadvertently leak knowledge (Ritala, 
Olander, Michailova & Husted, 2015). Reverse-engineering by competitors, which is 
more difficult to do with processes than products, can also undermine the value of a 
trade secret. There is little a firm can do to prevent independent discovery. However, 
while a competitor may gain knowledge of the innovation, it does not necessarily 
translate that a competitor will then disclose it. In which case, the trade secret remains 
a secret, but the firm no longer has exclusive ownership.  
Theft and misappropriation,xi however, present a threat to the economic success of 
trade secrets as a protection mechanism in both practice and policy. Theft can 
represent a strategic loss for the firm (Argento, 2013), and, at the national level, 
economic espionage creates national competitiveness concerns. The majority of theft 
is by insiders (Searle, 2012), but theft may go undetected or unreported, in which case 
the picture is unclear. There are multiple incentives not to report a theft, including: 
failure to detect the misappropriation, inability to identify the perpetrator, 
embarrassment, concern about disclosing the trade secret, business diplomacy, and 
convenience (Argento, 2013). Another challenge of pursuing theft or misappropriation 
is the risk of further disclosure of the trade secret in court proceedings.   
Not all firms or countries are victims of theft; some are perpetrators. Other people’s IP 
is valuable. East German economic espionage significantly benefitted the economy of 
East Germany (Glitz & Meyersson, 2017) and many developed economies have 
histories of using economic espionage as part of a growth strategy. As with patents, 
there are headline cases of large American innovative firms suing and counter-suing 
each other over trade secret misappropriation.  The liability of trade secret theft or 
misappropriation depends on the jurisdiction, for example the UK’s reliance on NDA 
shifts liability to employees rather than firms.   
The costs of trade secrets theft are both strategic and concrete. The impact of theft 
has less to do with the immediate theft, and more the losses arising from the loss of 
the secret (Lee-Makiyama, 2018). Survey evidence and industry reports suggest these 
include financial, goodwill, and innovation impacts on the firm (Passman, 2014). The 
EC report (Martinis et al., 2013), via a survey, identifies the following costs to 
business:   
1. loss of sales  
2. costs for internal investigation  
3. increased expenditure for protection  
4. costs for negotiating settlements  
5. costs for prosecuting and litigating 
Trade secret theft can affect firm performance. The announcement of the theft of trade 
secrets negatively impacts the stock market price of the trade secret owner (Carr & 
Gorman, 2001; Cavusoglu, Mishra & Raghunathan, 2004). Equally, a strengthening of 
trade secrets via court rulings, for example, confirmation of the US inevitable 
disclosure doctrine (IDD), may lead to positive abnormal returns (Klasa, Ortiz-Molina, 
Serfling & Srinivasan, 2018). However, trade secret theft is increasingly a cyber crime, 
and recent literature on cyber crime suggest that the impact on firm performance is 
relatively small or ambiguous (Arcuri, Brogi & Gandolfi, 2017; Hilary, Segal & Zhang, 
2016). 
Firms must weigh the direct and indirect costs of trade secrecy protection against the 
benefits, and the risk of the loss of trade secrecy. Striking the right level of IT 
investment, handling and access controls is not a straightforward task, and is 
particularly difficult given that assessing the benefits, i.e. valuing a trade secret, is 
difficult. 
  
How are trade secrets used?  
At the innovation, firm and economy levels, trade secrets support R&D and economic 
growth. They are an important fixture in the innovation landscape, and are often used 
with other IPR. However, trade secrets can also limit innovation by restricting the 
knowledge flows, and face a growing threat from economic espionage and 
cybercrime. 
Trade Secrets and other IPR  
Current literature uses patents to frame trade secrets as a means to protect 
innovation. This analysis starts with individual firm decision-making, and draw policy 
conclusions from these findings. The literature offers some insights into the choice to 
use trade secrets using economic models, such as Anton & Yao (2004) who 
determine that trade secrets can be preferred to patents, depending on the ‘size’ of 
the innovation. Other authors also use models to investigate the decision between 
trade secrets and patents (Bhattacharya & Guriev, 2006; Bulut & Moschoni, 2006; 
Ottoz & Cugno, 2006, 2008; Kultti, Takalo & Toikka, 2007; Mosel, 2011; Kwon, 2012; 
Panagopoulos & Park, 2015); or disclosure versus secrecy (Mukherjee & Stern, 2008). 
These models frame trade secrets as either complements or substitutes to patents.  
At a policy level, these dynamics can inform policy development. For example, 
stronger patent protection has positive effects on economic growth if trade secrets 
face a high risk of leakage; however, if this risk is low, stronger patent protection 
inhibits such growth (Suzuki, 2015). Empirical analyses of these dynamics offers 
insights into the use of trade secrets and patents in practice. Using UK data via 
Survey on Innovation and Patent Use (SIPU), Arora et al. (2013) find the following for 
UK firms:  
• UK Patenting firms are more likely to protect a larger proportion of their 
most valuable innovations using secrecy than non-patenting firms.xii   
• UK Firms without novel innovations, or firms that fear infringement, have a 
smaller share of innovations protected by trade secrets 
• UK Sectors that have high shares of secrecy do not show high shares of 
patenting 
These UK findings are confirmed by wider empirical work that demonstrates that 
innovating firms use both patents and secrets (Wajsman & García-Valero, 2017). A 
natural experiment analysing strengthening in trade secret laws in some US states led 
to a nearly 40% decrease in patents in the following yearxiii (Png, 2017b), suggesting 
that trade secrets are largely substitutes to patents. We can thus be fairly confident 
that patents can impact the decision to use trade secrecy, which has implications for 
both patent and trade secret policy.   
However, this patent-focused framing of trade secrets suffers from a key weakness: 
much of commercially relevant research cannot be patented (Lee-Makiyama, 2018). 
The literature has established that firms use trade secrets to protect non-patentable 
innovations such as marketing and organisational innovations; it is observed that 
misappropriated trade secrets are often software, in which case copyright is the 
alternative IPR. Marketing innovations may be supported by trade secrets and trade 
marks; many design rights will have started out as trade secrets. In heavily regulated 
industries such as pharmaceuticals and defence, regulations on disclosure may affect 
the choice of IP.  The dominance of patents in the trade secrets literature means that 
much of trade secrecy in practice, and its relationship with other types of IPR, is not 
well captured by existing research. 
Knowledge spill overs, flows and signalling  
In the incentive-to-innovate, social contract framing of the IPR system, disclosure is 
fundamental to the flow of knowledge. Trade secrets inhibit this flow, both within and 
between firms. High levels of knowledge flows and spillovers in Silicon Valley, thanks 
to a culture and network that encouraged the sharing of ideas, is credited for the 
area’s current technological and economic dominance (Syed, 2019). Trade secrets, 
and the cost to protect them, can act as a barrier to entry (Henry & Ruiz-Aliseda, 
2016). There are arguments that trade secrets reduce competition in the biosimilar 
market, and that the combination of regulation and trade secrets blocks fundamental 
knowledge generation (Price & Rai, 2015). 25% of respondents in work by Martinis et 
al. (2013) believe that trade secrets owners would use secrets to raise barriers to 
entry in their markets via aggressive litigation and other behaviours towards 
competitors. There is also a delicate balance between trade secrecy that encourages 
investment in R&D, and that which limits knowledge spillovers (leakage) (Png, 2017a; 
Ganglmair & Reimers, 2019). Negative trade secrets create environments in which 
competitors waste R&D investments on research avenues known elsewhere to be 
failures. These dynamics clearly impact economic growth. 
Strong trade secrets laws limit employee mobility (Png & Samila, 2013; Reder & 
O’Brien, 2011; Selmi, 2014). Restrictions on employee mobility are detrimental to 
innovation, however such restrictions improve the appropriability of trade secrets 
(Delerue & Lejeune, 2010). In comparison, weaker trade secret laws can foster 
mobility; in the US, rulings against the IDD are associated with a 10% higher mobility 
of university-educated workers (Png & Samila, 2013). Yet firms generally benefit from 
the reduction in competitive threats associated with the recognition of IDD (Klasa et 
al., 2018). This may benefit the holder of the trade secret, the employer, but the 
impact of this is reduced knowledge flows and hence reduced innovations (Contigiani, 
Hsu & Barankay, 2018). Restrictions on employee mobility appear to provide short-
terms gains to trade secrets owners, at the cost of long-term gains for innovation. 
  
Cybersecurity  
An emerging area of investigation is the ‘silent crime’ (Greiman, 2018) of trade secrets 
in cyberspace.  In the EC cyber report (Georgescu, 2018) all interviewees agree the 
theft of trade secrets through cyber means is a ‘concrete and growing threat.’ 
Cybercrime already leads to business disruption, increased costs and, in some cases, 
payments of ransoms – all of which divert resources away from R&D. In a cyber theft 
of trade secrets, only 10% of costs are the immediate and direct impacts, the 
remaining 90% is a longer-term loss of know-how, competitive advantage and jobs 
(PWC, 2018). Cybercrime is the preferred method for many of those engaged in 
industrial espionage (NCSC, 2018). At both the firm level and national level, the 
organised theft of trade secrets can compromise competitiveness. 
In the UK, the financial sector suffers the most intrusions (Martinis et al., 2013). In 
contrast, the highly regulated defence industry was an early adopter of incorporating 
trade secrecy in cyber strategies (Hermeneut, 2019). For cyber breaches as a whole, 
Europe does not compare favourably to the rest of the world: the time lag between the 
breach and detection is three times longer in Europe (PWC, 2018). As cyber security 
benefits from network effects (a kind of ‘herd immunity,’ the better the individual firm is 
protected, the better all firms are protected), policies to encourage investment in 
cybersecurity could decrease the impact of industrial and economic espionage. The 
diversion of R&D investments into the cybersecurity sector increases R&D investment 
in that sector; thus the loss of R&D investments is mitigated. 
Unfortunately, there are significant disincentives to report cyber breaches and 
economic espionage as a whole, as firms may not want to damage their reputation, 
acknowledge the existence and subsequent loss of secrets, or disrupt their 
relationships with governments  (Basuchoudhary & Searle, 2019). As such, empirical 
evidence for cyber theft of trade secrets is scarce, although it is likely most thefts of 
trade secrets involve a breach of cybersecurity. In a study of 200 trade secrets in the 
US virtually all cases have a cyber aspect (on file with author.) The cyber theft of trade 
secrets poses an immediate, but unfortunately opaque, threat to localised innovation. 
  
Analysis and Recommendations  
Trade secrets clearly represent an important and flexible innovation tool for firms and 
policymakers. However, little is known about their economic and innovation impacts in 
practice. As this report has shown, trade secrets are used by many sectors, may be 
used more in larger firms, and often provide a relatively low-cost protection 
mechanism. Trade secrecy is generally preferred to patents for process innovations, 
whereas product innovations generally benefit from patents. Trade secrecy also 
encompasses a wide range of marketing and organisational innovations, and 
knowledge that may fall outside the scope of traditional definitions of innovation. 
A key aspect of trade secrets is the relationship between innovation and trade 
secrecy. As with most forms of IPR, trade secrets serve to incentivise innovation by 
helping firms reap the rewards of their innovation and invest more in R&D. Yet trade 
secrets lack a key requirement common to other IPR: disclosure. Consequently, trade 
secrets also limit the flow of knowledge and labour, which can reduce future 
innovation. While strengthening trade secret protection may benefit existing trade 
secrets owners and encourage investment in R&D, it may come at the cost of long-
term innovation. 
The research points to key themes to consider in policymaking:  
a. Only a subset of trade secrets is potentially patentable; care should be taken that 
trade secret policy is not built on an implicit relationship with patents. Instead, 
trade secrets should be considered in the context of their wide scope of 
applicability, their interaction with process, product, marketing and organisational 
innovation, and their appeal to a variety of sectors.  
b. Encouraging investment in cyber security may be a good long-term solution to 
promoting a healthy trade secret environment. As a preventative tool, it 
proactively stops theft rather reactively address its fallout, and minimises the use 
of public resources.   
c. Trade secret awareness is likely weak. This is particularly the case for SMEs and 
may be the case in cybersecurity departments. Awareness and business support 
in this area could encourage efficient use of trade secrets and improve its positive 
innovation impacts.  
d. Further research is needed. The empirical evidence base needs expanding, and 
there are significant legal, management and economic questions. 
As discussed throughout this report, there is little empirical evidence to provide robust 
analysis for these themes. Four empirical approaches can help address this gap. To 
start further, trade-secret specific evidence should be collected through surveys. This 
evidence collection would benefit from a panel approach and could be achieved by 
working with existing surveys such as SIPU. Second, exploiting opportunities for 
natural experiment could discover insights free from the self-reporting challenges of 
surveys. Sector-specific natural experiments, where a software company may have 
released source code into the market, could provide further insight into the knowledge 
flow impact of trade secrets. At the national level, recent policy changes in major 
economies also provide opportunities; data collection in these jurisdictions should be 
encouraged. There is also unexplored data in related areas. The role of trade secrets 
in employment, particularly the UK’s reliance on contract law, could be further 
explored using labour economics and employment data. Finally, experimental 
economics using controlled lab-based experiments could provide insights into firms’ 
decision-making process for IPR. This could inform policy to support the efficient use 
of trade secrecy. 
The growing threat of cybercrime for trade secrets poses, however, a fresh challenge. 
These incidents are largely unreported and therefore building an evidence base is 
difficult. Mandatory or voluntary reporting requirements may be poorly used or result in 
over-reporting. Empirical evidence through carefully executed surveys and litigation 
data are potential methodologies on which to build an evidence base. Better 
understanding the scale and impact of these thefts and economic espionage will be 
important for developing appropriate trade secrets policy. 
Important questions remain. For example, what is the economic impact of the 
patentability of an existing trade secret? The research has only begun to address 
trade secret decision-making within firms. How is the choice to use trade secrets 
influenced by factors such as novelty, costs, competitors’ ability to imitate and barriers 
to competition? Informal discussions with experts suggest that there are potential gaps 
in trade secret management within firms. How do firms identify and protect trade 
secrets? What is the interaction between R&D staff, business staff, lawyers, and IT 
staff in protecting trade secrets? Competing priorities and incentives within firms may 
leave trade secrets unprotected. Legal questions abound. For example, investigations 
are needed in trade secrets in the tech sector, transparency, regulation and privacy – 
particularly in the context of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 
2016.) This potential list of topics only scratches the surface of the important role of 
trade secrets in developed economies. 
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